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The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy
ABSTRACT
If there has been a dominant trend in the evolution of the modern
industrial societies of this century it has been thegrowing importance of
government in the allocation of social resources. It is important that we
appreciate the fundamentally political nature of the formation ofgovernment
economic policy. This survey reviews and assesses ourpresent understanding
of how the political system might shape a nation's fiscalpolicy. Our
approach is eclectic, drawing both from economics and political science, and
decidedly micro-analytic in its orientation. From economics we adopt the
perspective of utility maximizing agents and the analytics of trade,
agreement, and market failure. From political science we learn just how and
when these individual agents might act collectively toprovide public goods,
redistribute income, or issue government debt. Together themicro-analytics
of economics and political science form the core theory of the 'new'political
economy and provide a framework for understanding the emergence, and the
performance, of governments. There is no more important test for the new
discipline than providing a compelling explanation for the formation of fiscal
policy in democratic societies.
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If there has been a dominant trend in the evolution of the modern industrial
societies of this century it has been the growing importance of government in the
allocation of social resources. Governments provide goods and services, redistribute
private income, and regulate economic activities. None of the major industrial nations
now allocate less than 20% of their national income through governments.1 As public
finance economists it has been our job to understand and to advise governments on
how best to play this role in the economic affairs of state. Wisely or no, our advice is
not often heard nor heeded. One does not have to look hard for the reason why:
government officials are themselves players in the game of social resource allocation.
What might be a compelling change in national fiscal policy from the perspective of
economic welfare maximation may be an invitation to political defeat for a President
or Prime Minister.
This pre-eminence of politics over economics does not mean that the
economist has no place in the setting of fiscal policy. On the contrary, we have more
than enough to do, either as impartial policy analysts, as inside political advisors, or as
outside critics. In each of these roles, however, it is imperative that we appreciate —or
better yet, understand —thefundamentally political nature of government economic
policy. At the conclusion to their survey of modern public finance, A. B. Atkinson
and J. E. Stiglitz caution that "the very real features of government behaviour —and
the wider political structure --mustbe taken into account in any realistic asessment of
the prospects for reform (1980, p. 576).'Understandinghow this wider political
Cameron (1978) provides an analysis of the recent experience.
1structure shapes fiscal policy is one of the central tasks of contemporary political
economy.
Our approach to the political economy of fiscal policy is eclectic, drawing both
from economics and from political science, and it is decidedly micro-analytic in
orientation. We find unhelpful an appeal to strict economic determinism —whether
neoclassical or Marxist —ora call to some unspecified political force--whether
Leviathan or the benevolent philospher king—as an explanation for a nation's fiscal
policy.2 From economics we adopt the perspective of utility maximizing agents and
the analytics of trade and agreement. We also find in economic theory the reasons
for government, notably, the failure of markets to commensurate all beneficial trades.
As Samuelson and others have noted, the essence of a market failure is the inability of
individuals to act cooperatively when cooperation provides an overall (i.e Pareto)
preferred allocation.3 The potential advantage of government in this regard is that as
a coercive institution it can discipline free riders and enforce some chosen collective
allocation. From political science we learn just how and when such collective actions
might arise to satisfy this demand for cooperative allocations. Together, the micro-
analytics of economics and political science form the core theory of the 'new' political
economy and provide us with a framework for understanding the emergence, and the
performance, of governments. There is no more important test for the new discipline
2 The neo-classicalposition is best summarized as Wagner's Law of government
growth (see Cameron, 1978), while a Marxist view of the state is presented in O'Connor
(1973) or Jessop (1977). The Leviathan view is summarized in Brennan and Buchanan
(1980) while the theory of the state under a philosopher king is, in effect, neo-classical
welfare economics applied to issues of public finance (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
See Inman (1987c) for a review of the market failure literature from this
perspective.
2than providing a compelling explanation for the formation of fiscalpolicy in
democratic societies.4
Before putting the new political economy to the test, however, it will be
helpful if we briefly review the simple analytics of collective decision-making.
Section II provides that review by focusing on one question of centralimportance:
When will majority-rule governments succeed in making collective choiceswhich,
given the exact institutions which are in place, no individual or group has both the
incentive and the ability to change the resulting allocation? We shall see that witha
simple majority-rule process with three or more voters and three or more policy
alternatives there is often no such stable outcome. This is a distressing result. It
implies, first, that majority-rule processes often cannot guarantee an efficient
allocation will be stable and, second, prediction of a chosen allocation ata given point
in time may not be possible. Fortunately, real democracies move beyondsimple
majority-rule to more structured collective choice processes. With that additional
structure can come stable allocations. In Section II we characterize the essential
components of these stability enhancing political institutions.
From this perspective, Section III reviews the recent theoretical andempirical
literature on the democratic determination of spending, taxes, and publicborrowing.
Voting models assuming non-cooperative behavior and models of negotiation and
coalition formation assuming cooperative behavior are reviewed. We summarize the
central results of each approach. While these initial studies are encouraging,they still
leave us far short of a compelling predictive political-economic model of fiscal choice
from which to make recommendations for institutional reform.
The new political economy has also been applied with some success to explain and
evaluate government regulation; see Romer and Rosenthal (1987) for a critical review
of that literature.
3Section IV concludes our survey by reviewing briefly our central conclusions
and by suggesting research direction which we feel hold promise for better
understanding the political and economic forces which shape fiscal policy in a
democratic society.
IL THE SIMPLE ANALYTICS OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE
As economists we are motivated to model political processes in order to
understand the properties of political resource allocation. This investigation has taken
two clearly discernable paths. The first, often referred to as social choice theory,
considers the properties of collective choice mechanisms in the most abstract way
possible; typically, the social choice problem only specifies the form of voters'
preferences and the dimensionality of the set of feasible alternatives, and the focusis
on the existence of an equilibrium, usually defined as that feasible alternative that
commands a majority against any other. The social choice approach can thus be
thought of a search for the properties that every majoritarian political process must
possess, independent of the particular organizational details of theinstitutional
environment in which collective decision-making takes place. Such an 'institutionless"
approach might provide a "long-run" description of an equilibrium to which
democratic political processes converge —ifthere is some identifiable policy that
commands a majority against any other, then most democratic or competitive
institutions might be expected to approach such a policy over time. Unfortunately,
the fundamental results of social choice theory show such an equilibrium exists only
in very special circumstances. In general, institutionless democratic processes cycle
among some or all possible outcomes without settling on a specificallocation.
In response to these negative results, a second branch of the literature has
sought to understand the effects of institutional structure on the existence and
4properties of equilibria in political process. This alternative approach, often called
the new political economy or public choice theory, expands the set ofmodelling
considerations to examine the details of the rules or institutionsgoverning the process
at hand —forexample, what constitutes an acceptable proposal and the order in which
alternative proposal can be considered. From the perspective ofpolitical resource
allocation, models constructed in the public choice tradition are much better behaved
than their social choice counterparts: once enough institutional richness is
incorporated in models of political processes, the inherent indeterminateness of
institutionless democratic choice is ameliorated. Theadvantage of the public choice
approach is that with specified and determinate outcomes, prediction —andhypothesis
testing —becomespossible.
While social choice theory might well be characterizedas helping us to
understand the necessary trade-of fs among the axioms of what shouldbe, public
choice theory is best seen as helping us to understand what is. It isto public choice
theory that we turn, therefore, for guidence to understanding the formation of fiscal
policy in democratic societies.
A. "Institutionless" Majority Rule
The intuitive case for simple majority rule is its administrativesimplicity —
holda vote and the outcome with more than half the votes wins —andthe fact such a
process is sensitive to citizen preferences. May (1952) formalized this intuition and
showed that simple majority rule is the only social choiceprocess which can reach a
decision for all possible citizen preference orderings (it isunrestricted), that uses only
these preference orderings to reach choices and therefore ignores the labelsor names
attached to voters (it is anonymous), that treats all alternativesequally affording no
option a special position in the voting (it is neutral), and that is responsive to changes
5in voter preferences (it shows a positive association). What simple majorityrule does
not do, unfortunately, is guarantee a stable allocation.
A simple example due to Condorcet (1776) of majority rule voting over three
alternatives —optionsA, B, and C —andthree voters illustrates the basic problem.
Table 1 lists the unrestricted preferences of these three individuals —denotedvoters 1,




Most Preferred A B C
OUTCOMES B C A
Least Preferred C A B
Decisions will be made using pairwise majority rule. We arbitrarily and
unimportantly assign B to be the initial status quo, and first pair it against A. From
the preferences specified in Table 1, persons 1 and 3 prefer A to B, so option A wins.
Now let A be the new status quo, and pair it against C. Since 2 and 3 prefer C to A, C
becomes the new status quo. But now compare B to C. B defeats C with a majority
composed of voters 1 and 2. In this example, an intransitive voting cycle emerges
from majority rule, since A defeats B, B defeats C, but C defeats A. No outcome
commands a majority against all other outcomes. Further, the example is robust to
permutations of its special structure. If every combination of tastes is equally likely,
then the probability that a voting cycle occurs is increasing in both the number of
voters and the number of alternatives; see Table 2. With 49 possible alternatives, the
6limiting probability (as the number of voters goes to infinity) of the occurance of a
constellation of voters' preferences that produces a voting cycle is .841.
Numberof voters
Number of
alternatives 3 5 7 9 11 25 49
3 .056 .069 .075 .078 .080 .084 .086 .088 4 .111 .139 .150 .156 .160 .169 .172 .176
5 .160 .200 .215 .224 .229 .242 .246 .251 6 .202 .251 .271 .281 .228 .303 .309 .315 7 .239 .2% .318 .369
8 .271 .334 .359 .415
49 .841
(From P.C. Ordeshook, Game TheoryPolitical Theory:Introduction,p38.)
The example in Table 1 and the calculations of Table 2 assume that all voter
preference orderings are possible and equally likely. But this extreme diversity in
tastes may be rare, which suggests the existence of some empirically reasonable
restriction on voters preference orderings that might allow us toescape from the
problem of voting cycles. One result, due to Duncan Black (1948, 1958), is
fundamental.6 Also known as the median votertheorem, Black's theorem shows that if
the social decision problem is single-dimensional andevery individual's preferences
over this single dimension are single-peaked, then a stable majority rule equilibrium
always exists. A collective decision problem is single-dimensional if the set of
These and similar calculations are found in Ordeshook (1986).
6 Sen(1966) has generalized Black's important insight. The theorem has antecedents
in the earlier work of Hotelling (1929) and Bowen (1943).
7outcomes can be ordered along a line —forexample, as spending levels or tax rates.
Preferences are single-peaked if each voter has a most preferred outcome —abliss
point or ideal point and utility for every other outcome decreases (weakly)
monotonically with the distance between it and the ideal point.
A set of such single-peaked preference orderings for three voters is shown in
Figure 1. In Figure 1, the voter with ideal point labelled 2 is the median voter -at
least half the voters have ideal points equal to or greater thanand at least half
have ideal points equal to or less than 2• Black's Theorem then states that the
median voter's ideal point is the unique, simple majority rule equilibrium. To see this,
consider any other alternative, say Z; assume without loss of generality that Z lies to
the right of 02. Because all voters preferences are single-peaked, all voters whose
ideal points lie to the left of 2 prefer 02 to Z. But by construction, all of these
voters to the left of 2' combined with 2' comprise a majority. Thus 2 defeats any
alternative to its right. A similar argument shows that it also defeats any alternative
to its left.7
To see how single-peakedness of voter preferences avoids a voting cycle, return
to the example in Table 1. Figure 2 graphs the preferences of the three voters. No
matter how we order the alternatives on a line, one voter's preferences are not single-
peaked; for example, in Figure 2c voter 3's preferences are double-peaked againstthe
An alternative proof is as follows. We restrict attention to the case of an odd
number of voters; the argument for an even number is similar. Call a subset of voters
that comprises a majority a majority coalition. Observe that any majority coalition
either consists of voters with ideal points that all lie (weakly) to one side of the
median ideal point, or it consists of voters with ideal points drawn from both sides of
the median. Since preferences are single-peaked, the median ideal point is in the
Pareto optimal set for every majority coalition, and is therefore in the intersection of
these Pareto sets. Since the median ideal point is Pareto optimal for all possible
















Outcomessingle-dimension ordering ABC.8 If we disallow such a double-peaked preference
ordering and substitute a single-peaked ordering for voter 3 such as C> B> A, then a
stable majority rule outcome will result. The reader can verify that this outcome is
alternative B.
The median voter theorem has great intuitive appeal, perhaps because the
notion of single-peaked preferences defined over a single-dimension corresponds to
the heuristics "left", "right", "center" that so often characterize colloquial political
discourse. Moreover, single-peaked preferences can often be induced in natural ways
from economic preferences. Figure 3a illustrates a voter's preferences for a public
good (G) and after-tax private income (y), where G indicates the voter's most
preferred allocation (ideal point), given his budget constraint defined by before-tax
income I and the effective "tax price" (ir)fora unit of G.9 Figure 3b maps each level
of G into a ranking based upon the preference ordering implicit in the indifference
curves of Figure 3a. G is the voter's ideal point, and feasible levels of G further and
further from G* are valued less and less. Preferences for G in Figure 3b are therefore
single-peaked. Because single-peaked preferences are often the logical consequence of
an economic demand model, the median voter theorem has formed the conceptual
underpinnings for many models that have contributed to our understanding of the
interaction between economic and political activity.
8 Tosee how Black's theorem now fails when single-peakedness does not hold, note
that persons 1 and 3 prefer outcome A to any outcome to its right, so A defeats all
such outcomes, and in particular, A defeats B. So far so good; B —anon-median
outcome —cannotbe an equilibrium. But 2 and 3 both prefer C to A, so A (the
median voter's ideal point) is not an equilibrium. And I and 2 both prefer B to C, so C
cannot be an equilibrium either. Thus, no equilibrium can exist with these
preferences.
This specification of a typical voter's demand for public goods appears in a variety
of places; see Inman (1979). Denzau and Parks (1979) and Slutsky (1979) provide a
















G* GOne obvious limitation of the median voter theorem, however, is its restriction
to preferences defined over a single policy dimension. A natural extension is to
consider restrictions akin to single-peaked preferences for multidimensionaloutcome
spaces. For instance, suppose society now seeks to use majority rule to allocate two
types of public goods, say education and defense. Assume further that each of three
voters has a quasiconcave utility function defined over these goods —thatis, each
individual has a bliss or ideal point indicating a most preferred level of eachgood,
with utility decreasing as the allocation moves away from the ideal point. The
indifference curves that result each enclose a convex set of points, each point strictly
preferred to every point on the curve. One such indifference curve for each voter is
drawn (for simplicity) as a circle in Figure 4 about each voter's ideal point.'0
Society now seeks to use majority voting to determine spending levels for these
two publicly provided goods. Will there be a majority rule equilibrium to the
resulting voting game? Not for the configuration of three voters' preferences shown
in Figure 4. To see this, initially limit the analysis to those allocations within theset
of outcomes that cannot be jointly improved upon for this set of voters —thatis, the
set of Pareto optimal outcomes. Because preferences are circular, the "contract curves"
between any three pair of voters (1 and 2; 2 and 3; 1 and 3) are given by thestraight
lines connecting their ideal points. For any point outside the resulting triangle, there
is at least one point within the triangle which is favored by all three voters. That is,
moves into the triangle from outside constitute Pareto superior re-allocations; thus, the
triangular set is often called the Pareto set of the voting game. Consider any initial
status quo in the interior of the Pareto optimal set, say point A in Figure 4. Take the
10 Ifall of a voter's indifference curves are circular, then utility is monotonic in the
Euclidean distance between the voter's ideal point and the policy outcome in question.






!perpendicular projection of A onto any of the straight lines connecting the ideal
points of any two voters, e.g point B. By construction, B is closer to the ideal points
of persons 1 and 2 than A, and because all indifference curves are circular, both 1 and
2 prefer B to A. Hence B, if proposed, commands a majority against A. Butnow an
identical argument implies that for any such B, the perpendicularprojections of B
onto each of the other two faces of the triangle (points C and D) each defeat B witha
majority. Repeating a similar argument for C and D shows that no majority rule
equilibrium exists in this two dimensional example.11 More generally, Plott (1967)
showed that unless the distributions of voter preferences exactly satisfiesa stringent
set of symmetry requirements, no majority rule equilibrium exists.12
Another way to see this is to recall that a majority rule equilibrium must lie in the
intersection of the set of Pareto optimal outcomes forevery group of voters that
comprise a majority. But by construction, each of the three two-person contract
curves that together form the triangle have no common intersection. Therefore, since
any given point can lie on at most two sides of the triangle (a corner), for any
outcome in the triangular Pareto set there always exist two voters (i) whose ideal
points define a side of the triangle and (ii) both prefer some point on that side toany other point on either of the other sides, or anywhere else. Since two voters forma
majority, every point can be defeated by some other.
12Suppose all voters have circular indifference curves and that the (presumed)
majority rule equilibrium point is the ideal point of only one voter. If this point is a
median in all directions —ifevery line through that point divides the electorate into
two sets such that at least half the voters' ideal points lie on or to one side of theline, and at least half lie on or to the other side of the line, then this point must be Pareto
optimal for every majority coalition: no group of voters that comprise a majority will
unanimously prefer this point to any other. Thus it will be a majority rule
equilibrium. With circular indifference curves, a sufficient condition for the existence
of a median in all directions is that the distribution voter ideal points be(radial)
symmetric about this point. More generally, Plott shows that for non-circular
indifference curves, it must be possible to pair each voter with another so that the
contract curve between each pair intersects at this point. Again, this follows because
a majority rule equilibrium point must be Pareto optimal for everygroup of voters
that constitute a majority. But by even slightly permuting such a radiallysymmetric
distribution of ideal points (or, more generally, permuting distributionssatisfying the
corresponding symmetry conditions for other forms of preferences) will revive the
indeterminancy problem. And in such circumstances the model makes no predictions
about the outcomes of the pure majority rule choiceprocess, since every possible
alternative can be defeated by some other.
11Where does all this leave us? We must conclude that only in very special
circumstances —singledimension, single-peaked preferences or multi-dimension,
symmetric preferences —canwe expect simple majority rule to yield stable public
choice outcomes. Otherwise, voting cycles among the available alternatives occur.
This nearly complete lack of determinancy under simple majority rule voting is
disturbing, for it runs counter to the observed stability in policy outcomesin most
democracies.
B. Political Institutions and Political Outcomes
One resolution of this conflict between the theory of majority rule and
political reality is to be found in the workings of political institutions. Public policies
are rarely, if ever, enacted by a simple majority vote of all eligible citizens choosing
over all policies simultaneously. Citizens often vote only issue-by-issue —oneducation
this time, tax reform next year. Perhaps it is not even the citizens who directly decide
policy but their elected agents —called"representatives" —whorespond to constituents,
but also may have their own preferences. And more often than not, collective
decisions are made in legislatures, with their own unique rules for just how final
policies will be decided. Such political institutions may inhibit the pervasivechaotic
tendencies of simple majority rule. These institutions can be described on one or
more of five dimensions, each of which can contribute to stability indemocratic
choice when appropriately specified. The five dimensions are: votes, on what,
when, where, and, finally, hQ.?
WHO Votes?
Certainly one important message of the Black and Plott theorems is that
preferences matter; both the existence and the location of majorityrule equilibrium
12depend upon the form and distribution of voters' preferences. This is at least partially
an institutional phenomenon; most democratic countries have universal
enfranchisement of their citizenry. But individual citizens in most democratic
countries choose whether or not to be a voter —toparticipate in the election —and
indeed, participation is far from universal. Democratic voting seems to involve the
absention of some voters even in elections as important as local tax rates or as well-
publicized as the choice of a President or Prime Minister.
Why do citizens who have the legal right to express their preferences over
public policies via the vote abstain from exercising that right? One answer is that it
is simply irrational to vote. Suppose there is a fixed agenda in a public referendum or
election, a choice between two alternatives. Voting —andvoting with care —takes
time and concentration and thus inflicts costs on the participant. Compare these costs
to the individuaPs benefits, which are bounded above by the utility difference between
the competing alternatives. The expected benefit of voting is simply this difference,
multiplied by the probability that the voter in question is decisive —thatis, the
probability that this voter makes or breaks a tie. For large numbers of other expected
voters, it seems to make no sense to vote: with a large number of voters, the
probability of being decisive is infinitesmally small. Against this logic, it is surprising
that anyone votes at all, but they do. Ronald Reagan was almost universally expected
to win the 1984 U.S. presidential election, yet more than 90 million Americans voted
anyway. Moreover, large numbers of voters participated even in Hawaii, long after
the media had announced (based on exit polls) that Reagan had won. Perhaps the real
paradox is not why voters abstain, but rather why they vote at all!
This paradox can be resolved, however, by recognizing that universal voter
abstention cannot be a stable equilibrium in voter participation strategies. If everyone
was expected to abstain, then one person could dictate the outcome with their vote.
13But this does not imply that each voter would choose to vote for sure, since if
everyone votes, each individual's vote will have an infinitesimaleffect on the final
outcome. Once again, each should now choose to abstain, since voting is costly. We
seem to have uncovered yet another cycle of instability in majority rule politics.
Paifrey and Rosenthal (1985) provide a compelling resolution to this continual
cycling between full voting and full abstention. They construct an equilibrium tothis
strategic voting game in which where each voter, given his expectations about the
probability of being decisive, is just indifferent between voting andabstaining.13
Within the context of their model, they show that participation declines as the size of
the electorate increases, and, importantly, in large electorates, only those voters with
negative costs of voting —thatis, those who derive direct benefits from the act of
voting itself —willfind it optimal to participate.
From our perspective of looking for stable public choice outcomes, the Palfrey-
Rosenthal result has dual importance. First, in large elections, strategic participation
in elections is no longer really an issue: only those voters who derive a direct benefit
from the act of voting (e.g., "civic duty") will choose to participate. Thus we can set
aside the problem of modelling the dynamics between participation and voting
outcomes and take the decision to participate as exogenous. Second, there may well be
a correlation between a sense of civic duty and preferences for public goods which
enhances the possibility of stable majority rule outcomes.
13 A similar resultwas derived independently by Ledyard (1984). Both Ledyard and
Paifrey and Rosenthal produce player stategies that comprise rational expectations
equilibria in the sense that information is updated using Bayes rule, subject to a
correct understanding of the game being played. In contrast to Palfrey and Rosenthal,
who assume exogenously determined voting choices and derive comparative statics for
empirical work, Ledyard allows for endogenous agendas set by competitive candidates.
14On WHAT Do We Vote?
In real democracies voting takes many forms: we vote for candidates, we
choose policies directly through referenda, and we vote in legislatures. Each such
election is subject to rules, both statutory and customary, and these rules often entail
significant constraints on the degree of competition between policy alternatives or
candidates. In the unconstrained world of open or institutionless majority rule there
generally are no stable allocations, but in the constrained world of real democracies,
there are. What is being voted on, and how that determination of the agenda is made,
is fundamental to the characteristics and stability of outcomes in democratic policy
choice.
Referenda, Legislatures, and Agenda.s When a stable majority-rule equilibrium
does not exist, the agenda or order of voting will completely determine the outcome
of the majority rule process. To see this, return to Table 1 above and consider three
alternative agendas. For concreteness, suppose that each of the outcomes A, B, and C
represent different allocations of economic resources, and that the outcome chosen
will be the social outcome. Agenda a first pairs A against B and then pairs the
winner against C, agenda 3 first pairs B against C and then pairs the winner against
A, and agenda -y first pairs C against A and then pairs the winner against B. Given
the tastes of the three voters shown in Table 1 and the assumption that all vote for
the outcome they sincerely prefer at every stage of the process, agenda a yields
outcome C, (A beats B and then loses to C) agenda f3 yields outcome A, (B beats C
and then loses to A) agenda -y produces outcome B (C beats A and then loses to B).
Therefore, the outcome of this agenda-modified majority rule process is completely
determined by the order of voting. With agenda setting, there is no indeterminacy.
15This observation —thatagendas are crucial determinants of outcomes —is
much more general than the three voter, three alternative example of Table1.
McKelvey's (1976, 1979) so-called "chaos" theorems show that with m votersand n
dimensions, if there is no stable, majority-rule winner, then there always exists afinite
agenda that leads from any initial status quo tootherpoint and back again.14 As
long as voters cast their ballots at every stage for the alternativethat they truly
prefer, an agenda can be designed to lead anywhere. In this sense,the observation
that majority rule is used to choose among alternative policies may place few
restrictions on the type of policies that emerge. Without information concerningthe
formation of the agenda, it appears that little can be said about the characteristicsof
such policies.
If agendas determine outcomes, then what determines agendas? In some cases
the institutional form may limit "entry" to such an extent that the agenda —say,in a
legislative process or referendum —isdetermined by a single individual or set of
similarly motivated individuals. In that case, identifying the incentivesof this
monopoly agenda setter permits predictions of the properties of political resource
allocations and other socially chosen outcomes. For instance, for the preferences
given in Table 1, suppose one individual is the agenda setter. Thatindividual can
propose the agenda which ensures his or herfavorite outcome —forexample, person 1
would propose agenda i which leads (if voting is sincere) to outcome A.
Although extreme, this story of a monopoly agenda-setter is not withoutits
analog in actual political processes. For instance, many localitiesin the United States
use direct democracy referenda to determine spending levels onlocal public goods. In
these referenda, an interested bureaucrat (in the case of school expenditures,the
14 Related contributions and extensions are due to Cohen and Matthews (1980) and
Schofield (1976).
16school board or superintendent of schools) proposes a budget. If a majority of voters
approve the budget it is implemented and the relevant taxes collected. Otherwise, a
constitutionally determined alternative budget —calledthe reversion --isestablished.'5
Romer and Rosenthal (1979) have examined the theoretical and empirical implications
of this institutional structure under the assumption that the monopoly agenda-setter
seeks to maximize expenditures. The agenda-setter presents the voters with a take-it-
or-leave-it choice between its proposed budget for the public good G and some
reversion allocation, R. Figure 5 reproduces the (induced) preference ordering of
voter i over alternative levels of G. For any reversion R, define E+(R) as the most
expenditure on 0 voter i would accept, given R. Then the assumption of a budget-
maximizing agenda setter leads to the prediction that the equilibrium budget equals
the median value of E(R). Furthermore, the model predicts a particular
relationship between the reversion R and the level of the final budget. Assume for
simplicity that E(R) is proportional to G1', so that the voter with the median ideal
point is also the voter with the median E(R). As long as R is less than the median
ideal point, we see from Figure 5 that the final budget E,(R) will exceed the
reversion R, but will decline as R increases. So when the reversion is less than the
median ideal point, higher reversions should be associated with lower spending. But
for reversions greater than the median voter's ideal point, a majority of voters prefers
the reversion to any increase in expenditure, so for those reversions E1(R) =Rand
the final budget increases with R.
Thus the agenda control model predicts that expenditures will always exceed
the median voter's ideal level. Intuitively, the agenda setter is really using the
15 At least36 out of 50 states use some form of this institution to allocate school
expenditures. Often these involve complex formulas determined at the state
constitutional level. Some also determine spending on fire, police, and other public
services in this way. See Romer and Rosenthal (1979).
17Median Voter's Utility
FIGURE 5








I Ireversion as a "threat"; the equilibrium expenditure level is equal to the agenda setter's
optimal proposal that drives the median voter to indifference vis-a-vis the reversion.
Very low reversions —say,so low that the schools must close —posesevere threats
(provide very low utility) to the median voter and therefore allow the agenda setter to
extract high budgets. As the reversion increases, it provides a greater benchmark
utility to the median voter, which, since preferences are single-peaked, reduces the
amount of expenditure the setter can extract. Once the reversion exceeds the median
voter's ideal point, the median voter prefers the reversion to any increase in
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Thus,unlike the possibility that 'anything can happen' as seen in McKelvey's
"chaos" theorems, the Romer and Rosenthal insight —thatthe exercise of agenda
control is limited by institutional arrangements —providesthe basis on which agenda
control models can be estimated and potentially refuted empirically. Shepsie (1979),
Shepsie and Weingast (1981), and Denzau and Mackay (1981) have applied this intuition
as well to explain the seemingly counter-theoretical stability that characterizes
legislative outcomes and processes. In contrast to the simple referenda setting,
however, legislatures must decide relatively complex issues. To do so, they use a rich
mix of institutions and practices that shape and color the exercise of agenda control.
For instance, under many parliamentary practices, a given question is often divided
into a set of sub-questions or basic issues. Each of these basic issues is then allocated
to one of several standing committees, each holding responsibility for a set of
predefined issues. Thus, rather than choosing allocations on every policy dimension
16 Numerous extensions and elaborationshave been made to this simple model.
These include investigation of the underlying sources of agenda power (Filiman,
Romer and Rosenthal (1982)), the case of multiple public goods allocated by several
bureaus (Denzau and Mackay (1981)), and the dynamic case where the reversion in the
current period is last period's expenditure (the status quo) (Ingberman (1985)).
18simultaneously (and exposing itself to a risk of instability), a legislature may vote on
"one issue at a time" via committee proposals, subject to parliamentary rules specifying
what type of amendments are permitted to a committee's agenda on the question at
hand and who may make such amendments. Stable, majority rule choices are shown
to emerge in these more elaborate institutional settings; see the discussion in section
III below. Although promising, such institutional modelling introduces a host of non-
trivial research issues, not the least of which is the risk of so over-specifying the
structure that the model simply reduces to description, without predictive power.
Elections, Candidate Competition, and Agenda Setter Preferences Many of the
testable restrictions of the agenda control structure follow directly from the depiction
of certain political outcomes as representing the incentives of a particular decision
maker, expressed subject to the constraints of institutional structure. It is probably
inappropriate, however, to assume that these tastes of legislators, agenda setters, and
other political actors are always exogenously defined "outside" of the political process.
Budget maximization may not be the appropriate description of agenda-setter
behavior. Rather, the desire to obtain and retain office can endogenously shape
politicians' preferences for actions in the public arena. Agenda-setters may be better
understood as agents for subsets of voters.
Clearly, then, understanding voter behavior is crucial to characterizing the
behavior of agenda-setters. Yet this fact raises again the possibility of "chaos" as
agenda-setters respond to the many voters' multi-dimensional preferences. Experience
suggests, however, that the rich multi-dimensional complexity that underlies the
"chaos" theorems may be absent in real world elections. One important paradigm —
associatedmost frequently with Downs' (1958) seminal work and with Fiorina's (1981)
extensions thereof —emphasizesthe notion that voters will choose to remain
"rationally ignorant" of the candidates' promises and positions. Rather than seek out
19and analyze information concerning the candidates at potentially great costs, Downs
supposes that voters will rely on inexpensive, readily available information, which
they will then process with easily implemented heuristics.17 One important Downsian
heuristic is that parties' 'positions' are proxied by ideological labels —"liberal",
"conservative", "moderate", and so on. Complicated, multi-dimensional policy positions
are thereby reduced to a single dimension --the"liberal-conservative" dimension —
overwhich voters have single-peaked preferences. Competition then occurs between
two parties who are solely motivated to win elections.18 Subject to certain technical
conditions,19 Black's theorem applies in this Downsian world. A stable equilibrium
emerges: both parties converge to the "center" and adopt the median voter's ideal point,
or here, the median voter's ideal ideological label. Once again, there is no
indeterminancy.
In the event that elections become multidimensional, however, Downs' model is
less reassuring. As we have seen, median voter politics do not guarantee stability in
the multidimensional setting without additional institutional structure. In an
important contribution to this end, Kramer (1977) has provided such additional
structure to the Downsian model of electoral competition. Kramer constrains the
incumbent candidate in the election to run on his record, and assumes that candidates
17 Alsosee Enelow and Hinich (1983) who formalize a set of related ideas. They
suppose that voters use candidates' position "labels" in one or a small number of
"predictive dimensions" to infer, albeit imperfectly, candidate positions on issues that
may arise in the future.
18 Downs also discussesmultiparty competition; see Cox (1986) for recent theoretical
work in this area. Other hypotheses of party/candidate motivation have been also
investigated, primarily the notion that candidates have some well-behaved utility
function defined over both winning and policy. See Calvert (1985) and Wittman (1983).
19 Thetheorem effectively requires: (1) the set of potential voters is "large", so voter
participation decisions can be taken as exogenous, and (ii) voters care only about the
post-election outcomes associated with the candidates, which they treat as completely
and accurately described by candidate stated positions.
20tend to maximize their votes in order to obtain a "mandate". Under these conditions
Kramer shows that the majority rule selection of competitive candidates produces
policy trajectories that converge to a small subset of the set of Pareto optimal policies,
called the minmax set. Prediction is once again possible.2°
One troubling implications of Kramer's model, however, is that it predicts that
the incumbent candidate will almost always lose the election: due to the generic non-
existence of a majority rule equilibrium in a multi-dimensional space, for any position
the incumbent is held to, the challenger can adopt some position that defeats it.
United States data suggests the opposite is true. For instance, in the U.S. Rouse of
Representatives, over 90% of incumbent Congressmen seek reelection, and over 90% of
those win another term.21 The assumed constraint on the incumbent's position is the
crucial and suspect assumption which forces this prediction of incumbency defeat.
Downs' arguments concerning voter information and beliefs seem especially pertinent
here. Because candidates differ in many respects —e.g.,abilities, motivations,
financing —votersmay need to evaluate candidates according to these other, non-
policy related attributes. Because voters have been observing the incumbent
candidates performing in office, they may have much more information about the
20By definition, the minmax set consists of all proposals for which the maximum
votes against the proposal is a minimum. This set can consist of one or more policies.
In related work, McKelvey (1986) has shown that there always exists a centrally
located subset of the policy space called the "uncovered set" that contains
"undominated" position choices for a candidate; no candidate would rationally choose
a position outside this set. Although the "chaos" theorems still hold in the sense that
no single point is generically identified as a majority rule equilibrium, there are
subsets of policies (i.e., the uncovered set) which can be specified, and to which
majority rule politics naturally gravitates.
21Ferejohn (1977) is a seminal paper in this area. He evaluates, and claims to refute
the "gerrymandering" hypothesis (i.e., the argument that incumbent reelection chances
are artificially inflated by their collusion to redraw district boundaries around
ideological lines).
21incumbent than they do about the challenger. Voters might well perceive candidates
as representing lotteries over post-election outcomes —inducedperhaps by "rational
ignorance" —ratherthan simply a single policy package. Models of electoral
competition would do well to consider the composition and evolution of voters'
information and beliefs about the candidates. Such models of electoral competition do
exist; they achieve stability in the multidimensional setting through the interaction of
information accumulation and political institutions.22
A Closing Caveat: Each of the models of public choice considered above rest
upon the assumption that at every opportunity presented, each voter or legislator casts
his ballot for their most preferred alternative, independent of how such a choice
might affect future allocations. In other words, all voting is sincere. Yet we cannot
rule out the possibility of strategic or sophisticated voting, of which the calculation "I
like candidate X's position most, but he has little chance to win, so I'll vote for
candidate Y, who has a better chance" is but one example. It is easy to construct
examples in which sophisticated voting —anindividual voter or legislator temporarily
misrepresenting his true preferences in order to improve his ultimate equilibrium
22 See Bernhardtand Ingberman (1985) or Ingberman (1986) for a model of
incumbent-challenger competition in which voters perceive an incumbent with the
same platform he had as a challenger to represent a less risky lottery than the current
challenger, but an increasingly risky lottery as the incumbent deviates from his old
position. Also see Enelow and Hinich (1983) for models of two-candidate competition
with non-spatial characteristics, and McKelvey (1980) and Shepsle (1972) characterize
the properties of two candidate competition over lotteries as a function of voters'
attitudes towards risk.
Of course, many other models of electoral behavior exist. Aldrich (1983) investigated
the roles of parties and nominating procedures. Cox (1986) examines primary elections
and nominating procedures with more than two candidates. Much work is left to be
done on the effects of campaign contributions and election financing (although see
Austen-Smith (1987) or Ingberman (1986)). Finally, at least in parliamentary
democracies, we are still left with the subtle and difficult question of exactly what
voters think they are voting for, at least in legislative elections. Is the relevant
question the ideology of the winner or the legislative outcome that will emerge,
conditional on the ideology of the winner? See Austen-Smith (1983).
22payoff —changesthe outcomes that result from a particular political institutional
structure.3
Stability can similarly be sensitive to the assumption of sincere or sophisticated
voting.24 How important sophisticated voting is in the realities of public choice is not
obvous, however. If, as Downs argues, information is costly and the benefits of
informed voting small, voters can be expected to look for the most transparent and
easily accessible measurement of political performance. In such a setting,
unsophisticated voters may actually force politicians and agenda-setters to behave
sincerely. Can a politician really defend his vote on a key issue as only a strategically
useful move within a multi-stage legislative game? Probably not, particularly if the
politician is being challenged by an aggressive opponent calling attention to this
"anomaly" in the voting record.25 So sophisticated voting seems most likely to occur
23 Forinstance, consider three alternative agendas, with voters and preferences as in
Table 1. Now assume (importantly!) that all voters know the preferences of all other
voters, and furthermore, expect all other voters to behave strategically. As before,
agenda a first pairs A against B and the winner against C; agenda 13firstpairs B
against C and the winner against A; agenda y first pairs C against A and then the
winner against B. To find the strategic voting outcome under agenda -y, we work
'backwards" up the agenda: At the last stage it can never help anyone to misrepresent
their preferences (i.e., everyone votes sincerely at the last stage). Since B is to be voted
on last, against the winner of C versus A, if B is paired against A at the last stage, A
wins, while if B is paired against C at the last stage, B wins. Thus, all voters know
that a vote for C at the first stage is really a vote for B as the ultimate outcome, while,
since it will defeat B at the last stage, a vote for A at the first stage is a vote for A as
the ultimate outcome. So the choice presented by agenda y is only between outcomes
A and B. Since a majority of voters prefer A to B, sophisticated voting produces
outcome A from agenda y, in contrast to sincere voting (which yields outcome B from
agenda -y). In particular, voter 3 will misrepresent his preferences and vote for A at
the initial stage of voting, even though he prefers C to A. The reader can verify using
similar reasoning that agenda a results in outcome B, while agenda 13 produces
outcome C. See Ordeshook (1986, especially ch. 6) for an excellent discussion of
sophistication and strategic behavior under various institutional assumptions.
24 Foran example of how stability can be upset by sophisticated voting, see Denzau
and Mackay (1981). For an example of bow sophisticated voting can bring about
stability, see Epple and Riordan (1987).
25 SeeIngberman (1986), Denzau, Riker and Shepsle (1986).
23in settings not subject to public review for example, legislative committees. The
frequency of sophisticated voting and its net impact on public decisions are important
empirical questions which remain to be answered.26
WHEN do we Vote?
Each of the models reviewed above is implicitly static in context. Each player
—whethercandidate, voter, or legislator —issolely concerned with his current period
payoffs. In some cases this may be a reasonable assumption. For example, in the
single dimension version of pure majority rule, there are essentially no dynamics: each
pair of candidates adopts the median voter's ideal point at every moment in time. But
in other cases static and dynamic analyses have divergent predictions; in these
situations an explicitly dynamic approach may be appropriate.27 Paradoxically,
perhaps, the added complication of dynamic decision-making may actually enhance
political stability. In static environments with sincere voting, cycling occurs precisely
because players do not look forward, but rather treat each vote as a final, once-and-
for-all play of the game. Once we allow voters to look forward, voting cycles need no
longer emerge.
This point is made clearly in an important recent paper by Epple and Riordan
(1986). They investigate the outcome of a three person divide-the-dollar (or cake)
26 See Enelow and Koehler(1980) who document several instances of sophisticated
voting in the U.S. Congress. But also see Poole and Rosenthal (1982), who find that a
simple one-dimensional model can correctly account for approximately 90% of
individual legislators' votes in the United States Congress. Thus strategic voting, to
the extent it occurs, appears to be infrequent.
27 Forinstance, in the Romer and Rosenthal (1979) monopoly agenda model with an
exogenously determined per period reversion, equilibrium expenditures always exceed
the median voter's ideal level; Ingberman (1985), however, shows that in a dynamic
budgeting game, the status quo reversion rule (i.e, an endogenous reversion equal to
the last period's chosen policy) can lead the setter to optimally pass budgets that fall
below the median ideal point.
24game, played repeatedly. The three voters alternately serve as agenda setter. At
each point in time, the current agenda-setter proposes a division of a dollar (or cake)
among the three players. In each period the current agenda setter makes a proposal
which cannot be amended; if at least one of the other two players approve the current
agenda setter's proposed division, then it is implemented. Otherwise, the last period's
allocation —thestatus quo is implemented. It is easy to see that a static version of
this game will not generate a stable outcome. But in the dynamic game, each voter, in
his periodic role as agenda-setter, can punish or reward the other players for their
previous behavior. Given this possibility of future retribution, the current period
agenda setter may be loathe to fully exploit his or her position of power. Not
surprisingly, the properties of equilibrium allocations in the Epple and Riordan model
depend crucially upon the players' rates of time preference. If individuals discount
the future only slightly, then voters' threats to respond to the current agenda setter's
unattractive offer with similarly unattractive allocations in the future become
credible. The current agenda-setter is thereby disciplined, and a stable allocation (or
stable dynamic equilibrium j)canemerge.
The difficulty in the Epple and Riordan model is not the paucity of equilibria
but rather their ubiquity. Depending on players' utility functions and rates of time-
preference, many dynamic allocations can be equilibria. For example, two players
may be able to 'exile" another and split each period's cake among themselves over the
infinite future. Alternatively, political cooperation or egalitarianism —i.e.,equal
division every period —canalso emerge endogenously as equilibria to this game. In
dynamic voting environments with repeat play, then, stable allocations, often
cooperatively decided, may become the norm rather than the exception. The problem
28 See also Baron andFerejohn (1986) who consider an analogous model of
legislatures.
25now becomes to decide which of the many possible stable allocations is most likely,
given the institutional structures currently in place.
WHERE do we Vote?
Up to this point we have focussed on the problem of voting cycles in majority
rule politics. But as first suggested by Tiebout (1956), theremay actually be no
problem at all, at least in on very prominent institutional setting —theprovision of
local public goods through a network of competitive localgovernments. In effect,
Tiebout postulated a political economy which operates exactly like a private market.
Perfectly mobile consumers are free to locate in any one of a number of small
competitive local communities (or "clubs') each of which efficiently provides a
congestible public good; consumers purchase their preferred level of the public good
simply by paying their chosen community's head tax or admission fee which covers
the costs of producing the public good.29 Although consumers located in different
communities may have different demands for the public good, mobilityensures that
within any community all consumers have identical demands. So within each
community there is perfect agreement, while the federalist structure of public goods
provision and consumers "voting with their feet" resolves all conflicts across
communities.
While the Tiebout solution to the problems of democratic fiscal choice is a
clever one, it requires a very special institutional setting whichmay not be easily
achieved. Consumers must be freely mobile between localgovernments; there can be
no significant moving costs nor can there be any important consequences for the
allocation of private goods and services with relocation. Communities must be in
perfectly elastic supply so that each can replicate all attributes of their competitors at
29 See Wildasin(1986) for a careful review of the Tiebout model and its applications.
26the same per unit cost. Communities must possess some mechanism for excluding
those consumers who do not pay the full costs of producing the local public good, and
the payment mechanism itself must have no allocative consequences (e.g, a head tax).
Finally, the public good must display congestion so that there are no significant
economies of scale which might make it attractive to mix (increasingly more
disparate) demand groups into a single larger and productively moreefficient
community. There are important situations where these institutionaland economic
requirements will (approximately) hold —largemetropolitan areas with available land
and local governments producing a congestible good like education with the right to
"zone-out" unwanted consumers —butthey are not likely to dominate the agenda of
public activities.
Nonetheless, the Tiebout insight is a useful on two levels. First, as usually
understood, decentralized federalist provision of public goods permits the diversityof
choice necessary to avoid the conflict that typically results from the unitary provision
of the public good. Second, even if conflict over public allocations does exist within a
community (i.e., perfect sorting has not occurred), where we vote canhave important
implications for the overall stability of the public sector. Specifically,if consumers
value stable public outcomes, they may actively search for those governmental
jurisdictions that not only give them a preferred level of the public goodbut also hold
the promise of doing so year after year. Indeed, when selecting where to live —and
vote —citizensmight well sacrifice a preferred expected public budget with awide
year-to-year variance for a less preferred expected budgetwhich has less variance.
Stability in fiscal choice will be encouraged thereby.
27HOW do we Vote?
Although simple majority rule is the most common form of democratic
aggregation of group preferences, nothing limits us to 50%majorityrule. If stability is
our sole objective, there is certainly one alternative: unanimity.30 Requiring all voters
to approve a move from a status quo will make Paretoallocation a stable public
choice. Democratic societies have generally not used this 100% majority rule, however,
and with good reason. Under unanimity, each voter becomes a veto agent to the
collective will of all others. There is likely to be too much stability in policy
outcomes, which may well lead to a more fundamental social instability.
Perhaps there is a compromise between the extremes of simple majority rule
and unanimity which balance the needs of stability and responsiveness? Caplin and
Nalebuff (1986) find a 64% maority rule to be just such a compromise in societies
satisfying two —notimplausible —restrictionson voter preferences. First, voters
supporting and opposing any given proposal can be divided by a hyperplane in the
space of voters' most preferred points. Euclidean preferences (circular indifference
curves) meet this requirement as do preferences which can be represented by a CES
utility function. Second, a density function describing the distribution of voters' most
preferred points must be concave. The second restriction implies a degree of social
consensus on policy allocations for it rules out bimodal distributions of preferred
allocations—that is, we cannot allow 40% of the voters to prefer $100 of public
spending, 20% of the voters to prefer $200, and the remaining 40% to prefer $300.
Uniform distributions and truncated normal distributions of ideal points are allowed,
however. In this setting, Caplin and Nalebuff obtain a very strong and reassuring
result: a voting rule which requires a 64% majority is immune to voting cycles.
30 SeeGreenberg (1979).
28Further, this 64% majority rule system will be responsive to voter preferences; for
example, when preferences are uniformly distributed over a policy space of n
dimensions, only (.28)flofthe points in the Pareto set are undominated (i.e., cannot be
overturned). Perhaps herein lies the answer to the remarkable stability over the past
200 years of the U.S. Constitution with its 2/3's majority amendment rule.
C.Summary
When markets and the price mechanism fail to allocate resources efficiently or
fairly, it is natural for societies to turn to other institutions which might correct these
failures. Government is one such institution and, for reasons of responsiveness and
fairness, pure majority rule is often the preferred democratic mechanism for deciding
new resource allocations. Unfortunately, the use of simple majority rule when there
are three or more voters and three or more alternatives does not by itself guarantee a
stable allocation. As the theory of collective choice makes clear, simple majority rule
can cycle endlessly among alternative allocations. Yet democratically decided
government allocations are often very stable. Why? The answer is simply that real
governments do not rely upon public referenda and simple majority rule alone to
make public allocations. In fact public decisions emerge from complicated
institutional structures which we have sought to characterize on five dimensions: who
votes, on what, when and where, and finally, how. Under pure majority rule, voting is
once and for all time (when), aggregation is by the 50% rule (how), and everyone (who)
within society (where) votes on all economically feasible allocations (what). As we
have seen, imposing any one, or even several, of these institutional features on simple
majority rule can produce stable allocations. An accurate characterization of such
institutional features —andtheir implications for collective decisions —istherefore
imperative to any empirical study of government allocations.
29III. DEMOCRATIC CHOICE AND FISCAL ALLOCATIONS
The democratic determination of fiscal allocations blends past events and
memories with current tastes, technologies, and political institutions to produce
services, taxes, transfers, and debts. We shall survey here what we now know and
offer suggestions for what we need to know before we can truly evaluate the
economic performance of democratic governments. We focus particularly on the
important role of political institutions in defining stable public sector allocations.
Both the conclusion that discretionary democratic fiscal policy has failed as well as
the conclusion that it functions well are premature.
A. Expenditures
Voting on Single Outcomes
The use of simple majority rule to determine the level of spending for a single
public good generates a very natural outcome: the median position in the distribution
of voters' preferred allocations. In the simple world of one public and one private
good, preferences over the provision of the public good are naturally represented as a
single-peaked preference ordering; see Figure 3 above.31 In this simple, but plausible
case, the median voter theorem applies; the unique equilibrium fiscal allocation is the
median voter's ideal point. Public allocations are thereby reduced to private decisions
made by the median position voter. The analysis then relies on economic demand
theory; the only real trick in using this model is to identify the median positioned
voter. Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) specified five conditions sufficient to identify
31Though Kramer and Kievorick (1973, 1974) obtain results for locally stable fiscal
allocations when voter preferences are not everywhere single-peaked. Such results are
useful for problems which naturally involve increasing returns to scale in the
provision of the public good.
30the median position with the voter with the median income, and Inman (1978a)
specified, estimated, and confirmed the Bergstrom-Goodman model for one sample of
majority-rule, single-dimension governments (Long Island school districts).32 Since
those papers, the median income voter model has become a cornerstone of the
empirical literature on government expenditures. We shall not review all these
findings here (see Inman (1979) and Rubinfeld (1987) for that) but the resulting
estimates of the price and income elasticities of demand for government services are
plausible and statistically significant. Further, such models succeed in explaining a
sizeable fraction of the variation in government spending within their samples. One
can do worse than to begin with a purely economic model of government spending
which emphasizes such purely economic variables as tastes, tax prices, and incomes.33
32 The five conditionsare: 1) each government represents citizens whose income
distributions are simple proportional shifts of the citizens' income distributions in the
other governments in the sample; 2) each citizen's tax price (zr) is a constant elasticity
function of the citizen's income; 3) all citizens have a log-linear demand for public
services as a function of income, the tax price, and possibly the characteristics of
other citizens in the government; 4) the price (13) and income ()elasticitiesof
demand and the tax price elasticity with respect to income (e) do not violate
a +3€# 0 and 5)thereis no strategic voting. These restrictions are limiting but not
totally unreasonable for the right sample of governments; see Inman (l978a) for one
effort at justification. Goldstein and Pauly (1981) have their doubts, however.
However, the median voter model is not without its problems and inconsistencies.
The most notable is the so-called "flypaper effect" observed for private income and
public grants-in-aid. As Bradford and Oates (1971) first noted, if the median income
voter model is the correct specification for government spending, then a dollar given
to the government as grants-in-aid should have the same fiscal effects as a dollar
given to the median voter as private income. In the median voter model the
government is a perfect agent for the median voter. In fact, almost every application
of the median voter model finds that a dollar of private income increases public
spending by $.1O or less while a dollar of grants increases public spending by $.50or
more; see Inman (1979). Money seems to stick where it hits. There have been
numerous attempts to explain this empirical anamoly within the structure of the
median voter model; see Inman (1979, due to a federal tax wedge), J. Hamiliton (1986,
due to the excess burden of taxation), and B. Hamilton (1983, due to misspecification of
government production technologies). But each of these suggestions is insufficient as a
full explanation for the observed differences in the effects of aid and income. The
answer to the "flypaper" conundrum is most likely to be found in an extension of the
median voter framework to allow for more than simply the calculus of household
31Yet one can often do better by adding institutions and history to the story.
This important fact was brought to the analysis most clearly and forcefully by the
work of Romer and Rosenthal (1979, 1982) in a series of important papers on one-
dimension, majority-rule politics with an agenda-setter. While the pure median voter
model assumes that all proposals or budget levels can be presented for consideration
(an "open" agenda), Romer and Rosenthal specified and tested an alternative model in
which a "closed" agenda is controlled by a budget-maximizing bureaucrat; see section
II.B above. Of course the agenda-setter is always free to offer the median voter's
preferred budget; thus the Romer-Rosenthal model also includes the median voter
model as a special case.
Romer and Rosenthal test these nested models of median voter and agenda-
setter politics using referenda and expenditure data from a sample of Oregon school
districts, each having a different reversion level. Recall from Figure 5thatthe model
predicts that as the reversion level decreases, public expenditures increase. In contrast,
the open-agenda, median-voter model predicts government spending will be
independent of the reversion levelthat is, spending always equals the median voter's
preferred allocation. When the two models are tested side-by-side, Romer and
Rosenthal find that the reversion level has a significant negative effect on
government spending —justwhat the agenda-setter model predicts and contrary to the
prediction of the median voter model. For their sample, they find that the agenda-
setter's monopoly power increases a typical Oregon school district's budget by 15%
over what the median income voter might have preferred.
demand theory; see the excellent review in Fisher (1982) and the recent work of
Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal (1982).
Other observations found to be consistent with the setter model include: (1)
lengthy school closings in Oregon have occured, after numerous defeats of the school
board's proposals; (2) Oregon districts that did not hold referenda generally assessed
their aggregate reversions, and essentially no proposed decreases in expenditure were
32Voting on Policies with Multi-dimensional Outcomes
Both the median voter- and Romer and Rosenthal's agenda-setter models have
limited empirical application, however, as they focus only on policy choices over one
dimension or issue. Although there are important instances where such a restriction is
plausible —e.g.,special provision governments such as school districts in the United
States —politicaldecisions often encompass many issues simultaneously. As we have
seen in section II, however, this fact creates special problems for stability in fiscal
choice. Restrictions on voter preferences and budget constraints no longer guarantee
a stable budgetary outcome.35 Once fiscal choice involves two or more policy
dimensions —e.g.,education and national defense —politicalinstitutions and political
history are no longer simply a nice, maybe even compelling, addition to the story.
observed, exactly as predicted by the model when the reversion exceeds the median
ideal point; and (3) districts with very low reversions (e.g., the schools close) generally
have budgets approved with very narrow majorities as predicted by budget
maximization. See Romer and Rosenthal (1979).
Although the Romer-Rosenthal model has been an important step forward in the
specification and estimation of government spending behavior, we should not discard
the median voter model altogether. Romer and Rosenthal reject the median voter
model for their Oregon sample, but in other institutional settings it may be the correct
specification. The question is fundamentally an empirical one; the answer turns on
whether the Romer-Rosenthal agenda-setter has sufficient power to influence the
final outcome. Ingberman (1985) shows that when the reversion level is last year's
budget —calleda dynamic reversion —theagenda-setter's allocation converges towards
(but does not reach) the median voter's preferred allocation. Alternatively, the budget-
maximizing agenda-setter may not be capable of enforcing an all-or-nothing offer on
the median voter —thatis, the median voter may have the ability to remove the
bureaucrat from office if he tries to exploit his position. The median voter and the
agenda-setter models therefore stand side by side as equally plausible explanations for
single dimension budgets. We should test them both against the data, as Romer and
Rosenthal themselves have done; see Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal (1982) and also
Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982).
Though an interesting paper by Gevers and Proost (1978) with a comment by Parks
(1979) provides one class of utility functions which are sufficient —whenjoined with a
linear budget constraint —togiven stable majority rule allocations in a two-dimension
policy problem.
33Institutions and history become the essential components, for these structures are
necessary for stable budgetary allocations.
In an important paper on the role of political institutions, Shepsle (1979) shows
that the granting of agenda-setting power to select individuals or groups can produce
stable majority rule allocations in the case of multi-dimensional policy choices. The
final allocations —calledstructure-induced equilibria (SIE) —areconditioned by
budgetary history and the constitutional rules that define this agenda-setting power.
Figure 6 (similar to Figure 4 above) illustrates the basic structure of such a model. In
this example there are two policy dimensions (education, g1, and defense, g2) and three
voters denoted W ("rich"), M ("middle"), and P ("poor"). As with Figure 4, we assume
(for convenience) that each voter has circular indifference curves about a most
preferred allocation, denoted by points W, M*, and *respectively.Recall from
section II that the solid lines connecting the three "bliss" points are contract lines
between pairs of voters. In this case simple majority rule will not generally provide a
stable outcome. Here, however, we shall allow one group to be the agenda-setter —for
example, group W. W proposes an alternative and if a majority of the three voters
approves, then that alternative is chosen. Each alternative must be some combination
of spending on g1 and g2. If no alternative is chosen within a stated period of time —
sayby the start of the new fiscal year then the new allocation reverts back some
other pre-specified allocation, denoted by the point R in Figure 6. Point R is the
reversion allocation in this model, and it plays a role identical to the reversion level in
Romer and Rosenthal's one dimension policy model. As agenda-setter, W will select
that alternative which maximizes his well-being subject to the constraints that a
majority approves and that point R is the reversion point.
Since W controls the agenda, he can limit the other voters to a take-it-or-leave-







M*W*M* or WP contract lines; this allows him to extract as much surplus from M and
P as possible. M and P will agree to vote with W as long as the proposed alternative
improves their welfare over that offered by the reversion level R. Thus W should
only consider alternatives along the heavy shaded segments of W*M* and W*P*. Point
e' is the best of those alternatives for the agenda-setter W. Similarly, if voter P is the
agenda-setter and R is the reversion level, then point p is the equilibrium allocation.
Finally, point -y will be the equilibrium allocation if we again start from R but M is
the agenda-setter. All three allocations constitute a stable equilibrium, provided the
political structure (institutions) and the status quo point (history) remain fixed.
More elaborate institutional structures than simply one agenda-setter can be
specified within the SIE framework; as noted in section II, real world political
institutions are rich in detail. Shepsie (1979), for example, considers a model with two
agenda-setters, one for each policy dimension. He calls each agenda-setter a legislative
committee. Each committee offers one alternative along its policy dimension for
majority-rule consideration by all voters or legislators. When deciding its preferred
alternative, the committee takes the allocation along the other policy dimension as
given, perhaps, for example, the policy's status quo level, Voters are then asked to vote
—yesor no —onthe new proposed budget consisting of a new allocation on the
committee's policy dimension and (say) the status quo allocation on the other
dimension. If the proposal fails, then the budget reverts back to the status quo point
on both dimensions. As Shepsie recognizes, it is most likely that the two agenda-
setters will play a game against each other in this setting, each selecting their proposal
If the status quo point is not fixed then a new equilibrium will emerge.
Specifically, if the budgeting process is a dynamic one in which last period's budget is
the next period's status quo, then it is possible to show that the group that controls the
agenda can move the final allocation arbitrarily close to its bliss point over time.
Starting from e, for example, the next period allocation will be closer to W* than €.
35on their policy dimension so as to influence the choices of the other agenda-setter.
Shepsie solves this budget game by assuming the two agenda-setters design their
preferred budgets, taking the other agenda-setter's last proposal as given. The resulting
equilibrium is one example of a structure-induced equilibria.37
Although a promising format for theoretical and empirical analysis of fiscal
policy-making38, there are at least two strong predictions of SIE models which do not
accord well with the common patterns of budgetary politics. First, in most majority
rule STE models, fiscal allocations are decided by only a bare majority, sometimes
known as the "minimum winning coalition." Second, that majority and its resulting
allocations can change radically with only small shifts in the status quo point or with
changes in the controlling agenda-setter. Neither implication corresponds very well to
typically observed budgetary behavior in real democracies. More often than not,
budgets are approved by large majorites, and further, they seem to deviate very little
(at least in real terms) from what was done last year, even when agenda control shifts
The stability of the equilibrium or even its existence is by no means guaranteed,
however; see Shepsie (1979).
Variants of Shepsie's STE model have been proposed and employed in the analysis
of fiscal policy. Mackay and Weaver (1983) have used an extension of the SIE model to
examine the strategic behavior of budget maximizing agenda-setters. Ferejohn and
Krehbiel (1987) use the STE model to analyze the propensity for increased spending in
the U.S. federal budgeting since the passage of the 1974 Budget and Impoundment and
Control Act.
Serious econometric analysis and testing of the STE model is only just beginning,
however, Craig and Inman (1986) have specified and estimated a reduced form for an
SIE budget model, examining state government allocations over education and welfare
spending. While they cannot establish the precise identity and influence of the
agenda-setter, their results do show the importance of the status quo point to such
allocations. Structural models of a simple STE process can also be specified and
estimated. One strategy would be to 1) a priori identify the agenda-setter, 2) then
model the two contract lines between the agenda-setter and each of the remaining two
voter coalitions, and finally, 3) estimate the model using disequilibrium econometrics
to determine each contract line and to identify the chosen allocation.
36from one voter or coalition to another.39 Multidimensional budgetary politics appears
to involve more structure than simply an agenda-setter and a status quo point as
emphasized by SIE models.
What is missing from these models of fiscal politics? Perhaps more any
anything, it is the sense of politics as an art of compromise. Inherent in the structure
of SIE models is the non-cooperative nature of fiscal choice by majority-rule
processes. Communication and agreements among participants are ruled out. To
bring order and stability to such non-cooperative environments, it is necessary to
move beyond simple majority rule and to assign specific (e.g. agenda-setting) powers to
specific voters. In these models the agenda-setter has enormous power, however.
Indeed, in the simpliest case of Figure 4, the agenda-setter W may be able to achieve
his bliss point at the expense of the other voters, M and P. It is hard to believe that
voters M and P would tolerate such an arrangement for very long. As Riker (1982) has
pointed out in his own critique of SIE models, such a monopoly agenda-setting
institution may itself be unstable in a society ruled by democracy. A more likely
characterization of agenda-setting power in a true democracy would be a system of
rotating agenda-setters. If this is so, then we are willing to conjecture —basedupon
the important recent work of Axelrod (1984), Cremer (1986) and Epple and Riordan
(1987) —thata cooperative process of fiscal allocations which shares the fiscal
surpluses in any period across all voters may better capture the essence of multi-
dimensional fiscal politics. Under such a system everyone is likely to get something
and that something is likely to be stable over time. No one voter dare exploit fully
the advantage of being the agenda-setter, for fear of being banned from all future
On budget approval by large majorities, see Weingast (1979). The sizeable
literature on incremental budgeting documents the stability of fiscal allocations over
time within a given governmental setting; see Davis, Dempster, and Wildavasky (1974).
37allocations by the other voters.40 Stable and unanamously approved fiscal allocations
are likely to result from such cooperative political agreements.
One such cooperative arrangement, called the "norm of universalism," has been
described and analyzed by Weingast (1979) and its implications for fiscal policy have
been developed in Weingast, Shepsie, and Johnsen (1981).41 The norm of universalism
provides a cooperative institution as a solution to the uncertainty associated with
democratic allocations with ex ante unknown agenda-setters in a non-cooperative
majority rule game. Under the norm of universalism each voter is allowed to submit
his or her preferred public budget, composed of government projects which offer
positive, but diminishing, marginal benefits. The norm of universalism requires all
voters to approve all projects with the understanding that all voters will share in the
costs of all projects approved. Defectors are punished by having all their future
projects defeated by the other voters. The final budget will be the sum of all
approved projects.
These approved budgets under universalism will usually be larger than the
budgets under bare majority rule where only those projects preferred by the minimum
winning coalition are approved.42 Larger budgets mean larger tax costs for each
40Epple and Riordan (1987) cite two examples in which a U.S. Senator lost all of his
favorite local projects because he failed to support the fiscal agreements of his Senate
colleagues.
41 Extensions of the Weingast analysis can be found in Niou and Ordeshook (1985).
42 This will be true for two reasons. First, since all voters share in the cost of each
project, the tax price to each voter when deciding how much to spend on his project
will be very low —forexample, 1/rn if the m voters share the costs of each project
equally. Under an agenda-setting majority rule process, the agenda-setter will
internalize the majority's share of all projects' costs but ignore those project costs
borne by the minority. With equal tax sharing, a majority of size i.selectsprojects
using a tax price of jJm, the percent of voters in the majority. The lower tax price
under universalism (/m >1/rn)induces each voter to ask for a larger project. Second,
rather than a majority of projects approved, all voters' projects are approved under
universalism.
38voter. As compensation, however, universalism guarantees that each voter's projects
will be approved. In contrast, under bare majority rule the losing minority stillpays
taxes but receives no projects in return. Voters will favor the adoption of the norm of
universalism when the expected benefits from universalism exceed the expected
benefits from continuing with bare majority rule. This is most likely when each
voter's membership in a winning bare majority is uncertain: better to takeyour project
and higher taxes with certainty than risk paying taxes and getting no project at all!
There is much case study evidence attesting to the presence of the norm of
universalism within the U.S.Congress.43In addition to these case studies, Inman
(1987b) has provided the first statistical test of the effects of the norm on the size of
the federal budget. He specified an expenditure model in which a baremajority
budget and a budget under universalism are competing hypotheses. The alternative
hypotheses were then tested for their effects on federal expenditures for state and
local government grants-in-aid over the period 1948-1985. The test is structured to
detect a shift in the level of Congressional spending following the Congressional
reforms of 1969 to 1972 which significantly reduced the the ability of a fewstrong
agenda-setters to control fiscal allocations; see Ornstein (1975). In effect, Congress
went from a budgeting process with known agenda-setters to a process where the key
points of power became more uncertain. The observed institutional response to this
increased uncertainty was the emergence of budgeting under universalism; see
Stockman (1986). The predicted budget outcome was increased spending, all else equal.
Inman found that U.S. federal spending on one major set of domesticprograms —
supportfor state and local governments —didincrease significantly (by 24% in real
terms) as the politics of Congressional budgeting shifted from tight control by agenda-
See Weingast (l979) and the references therein.
39setters to universalism. Whether these results generalize to other federal spending
remains to be seen.
B. Taxes and Transfers
Redistribution of private, after-tax incomes is the essence of conflict and
instability in democratic societies, but such societies do reach agreements on these
matters. In its barest form, the problem of tax and transfer policy in democracies can
be reduced to a one-time majority-rule redistribution game of divide-the-cake. As seen
in section II, if there are 3 or more voters, then there is no stable solution to such a
game. Any majority coalition can be undone; a small bribe from the minority to a
member of the existing majority will be sufficient to overturn the old majority. As in
the analysis of expenditure policy, the solution to this instability is to impose
additional structure on the process.
That additional structure may come by first reducing what is fundamentally an
rn-dimensional policy choice —onedimension for the after-tax income each of the m
voters —toa policy choice on one dimension. Then if voters' preferences can be
plausibly argued to be single-peaked over that single issue, Black's theorem applies,
and the most preferred allocation of the median voter is the majority-rule equilibrium.
This has been the approach of Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richards
(1981). In their models, voters are assumed to have similar preferences over the
after-tax consumption (c) and work effort (e) but to differ in their ability (s) to earn
income. The first crucial restriction in the models is to limit government tax and
Foley (1967) was the first to propose a formal voting model of the determination of
tax and transfer policy. In Foley's model the median voter is decisive, but the model
does not allow for the incentive effects of taxation. Further, feasible policies are
limited to linear tax schedules. The model predicts that when the median before-tax
level of income is less than the average, the resulting after-tax distribution of income
will be made perfectly egalitarian.
40transfer policy to linear income tax schedules of the form: T(I) =tI-a,where I is
earned income and equals ability times effort (I =Se),t is the constant marginal tax
rate, and a is the level of the lump-sum subsidy (a >0)or tax (a <0).After tax
consumption to each voter equals c, defined as c =(1-t)I+a=(1-tXse)+a.The
voter selects work effort to maximize utility. The resulting labor supply schedule is a
function of the net wage from effort and the lump-sum tax or subsidy. Once e has
been chosen, I and then c are determined as well.
Limiting the analysis to a linear tax schedule involving the two policy
variables tanda does not appear to help us very much. We still seem to have a policy
problem in more than one dimension. Invoking the government's budget constraint,
however, proves to be enough (with a mild restriction on voter preferences) to
collapse the two dimensions of the linear tax structure into one. Total taxes raised
must equal total government spending (G). Formally, T(I) =G,or with a linear tax
system, m(t1 -a)=Gor a =t1-(G/m),where 1 is average before tax income of all
m voters and is itself defined as I =1(a,t).Substituting1(a, t) into the
government's budget constraint gives a single equation which implicitly relates the
marginal tax rate t to the lump-sum subsidy a. As Romer and others have shown, a is
monotonically increasing in t,providedleisure is a normal good. For most plausible
economies, then, the choice of the marginal tax rate implies a (unique) choice for the
level of the lump-sum subsidy; increasing the marginal tax rate means the government
can pay a larger lump-sum subsidy or impose a lower lump-sum tax. Importantly, now
the choice of t defines a and the tax-transfer policy problem becomes a decision on
one dimension —themarginal tax rate, t.
We need one final assumption, however, before we are safely within the
confines of Black's theorem. To show that voters' preferences are single-peaked,
voters' preferred marginal tax rates must be ordered along the t dimension and each
41voter's preferred rate must be independent of the preferred rate of other voters.
Roberts (1977) shows that this condition will be met if the ordering of voters' pre-tax
incomes is independent of the choice of t, thereby effectively ruling out strategic
voting, and Romer (1977) and Meltzer and Richards (1981) show in turn that Roberts'
condition holds within the structure of this model if each voter views consumption (c)
as a normal good. When consumption is a normal good, then pre-tax income rises
with ability no matter what the value of t. Further, from Roberts (1977) we find that
voters with higher pre-tax incomes prefer lower marginal tax rates. Preferred
outcomes (i.e., voters' ideal points) can now be ordered along the one dimension, the
tax rate. Black's theorem can be applied, and the equilibrium tax rate t is the rate
most preferred by the voter with the median level of pre-tax income or, equivalently,
productive ability.
What will be the majority-rule value for t*? First, t is less than 1, since: (i) the
least able person prefers to make the subsidy a as large as possible, but (ii) a will be 0
if t￿ 1,since no one will work and there will be no revenues, so (iii) the least able
person prefers a tax rate less than 1, and (iv) so too must the median positioned voter,
since the preferred marginal tax rate falls as ability increases. Second, t is positive if
and only if the average level of ability (and pre-tax income) is greater than the
median level of ability (and pre-tax income). Since most measured distributions of
incomes and abilities are positively skewed (i.e, where the mean is greater than the
median), we can use this majority-rule model to provide an explanation for why,
empirically, the marginal tax rate is bounded between zero and one. Further, from the
government's budget constraint (a =t*I-G/m)we see that a will then be positive if
G =0.But if G >0,a may become negative —thatis, when government public
goods spending is large enough we may need both a positive marginal tax rate as well
42as lump-sum taxes to balance the budget.45 The model highlights a fundamental
tension between the provision of public goods and support for the poor within
democracies. That is an important accomplishment.
As an explanation of the actual tax and transfer systems in most Western
democracies, however, the linear-tax majority-rule model is incomplete. Because it
requires a fixed marginal tax rate, the model, by its nature, cannot explain one of the
most prominent features of democratic tax systems, namely progressivity.46 Does
democracy logically lead to progressivity? Kramer and Snyder (1983) offer one
majority rule model to show that if (i) voters are restricted to considering only
constant or rising marginal tax rate schedules, and (ii) the labor market divides into a
tax and untaxed sector and voters' labor supply allocations between the two sectors is
such that each voter's after-tax income has a unique maximum for some progressive
tax schedule, then voter preferences over these tax schedules are single-peaked in
income and the median voter's preferred schedule is then the majority rule outcome.
If voters are only interested in maximizing their own after-tax incomes, then the
resulting equilibrium tax schedule is a fixed head tax (or subsidy) for all voters with
abilities (or pre-tax incomes) equal to or less than the median's, and then a high
marginal tax rate on all voters with abilities greater than the median.47
In simulations with this model Romer shows that a*turnsnegative as public goods
spending (defense, education, roads, and the like) approaches 25percentof GNP; the
U.S., at least, is near this threshold.
46 Arecent OECD publication shows marginal tax rates to be rising with income in
all the major Western democracies with the exception of Australia; see Kramer and
Snyder (1983, Table 1).
Since (by assumption) marginal tax rates must be constant or rising with ability,
the median voter maximizes revenue by imposing a flat tax on all lower ability voters
voters up to and including himself, and maximizes revenue from more able voters by
imposing a high marginal tax rate on them. Maximizing revenue from all voters
below and above allows the median ability voter to minimize his own tax payments or
maximize his own subsidy.
43While the resulting tax schedule from the Kramer-Snyder model does have
rising marginal rates, it too falls short of a compelling explanation of most observed
tax and transfer systems. First, there are only two rate classes. Second, the median
ability level is the dividing point; the median voter therefore pays the same lump-sum
tax or receives the same lump-sum subsidy as the poorest ability household in society.
Empirically, this is rarely the case.48
The work of Romer and others on the linear-tax model and that of Kramer
and Snyder on progressive rate models illustrate the limitations of a strict majority-
rule approach to what is inherently a rn-dimensional policy problem, one dimension
for each of the m voters. Models with more structure than strict majority rule are
needed. Cukierman and Meltzer (l986b) provide such a model, employing Shepsie's
framework of structure-induced equilibria. In their model, voters first decide on the
average tax rate (t) and the level of the transfer (a) to be paid to lower income
households, given the degree of tax progression (assumed to be measured by a single
parameter, p, where p =0implies proportional taxes, p <0implies regressive taxes, and
p >0implies progressivity). As in the linear-tax models, this initially two-dimensional
problem (a and t)becomesa single dimension policy problem —votingon t —because
of the government's budget constraint. A unique median voter equilibrium exists
(under restrictions similar to those imposed in the linear tax model) which defines the
majority-rule level of t as =t(p).Voters then decide on the values of a and p, given
a value of t. This decision also reduces to a one dimension policy decision —votingon
p —againbecause of the government's budget constraint; a unique median equilibrium
48 Notetoo, the important role that the assumed constraint that only constant or
progressive rate schedules be considered plays in their analysis Without that
constraint, the median income voter would favor schedules which are regressive over
lower incomes and progressive over higher incomes. It is not clear that such a
schedule could ever become a stable majority rule equilibrium, however.
44for p exists defined as =p(t). Withsincere voting, an overall equilibrium is defined
as the intersection of these two schedules of median preferred tax parameters.49
The political structure of the Cukierman-Meltzer model is (as they admit)
artificial, but it is not without motivation. The economic consequences of tax policy
for the middle class will be set by the level of the lump-sum subsidy a and the average
rate t,whilethe consequences of policy for the poor and the rich will turn primarily
on the values of a and p, respectively. Further the middle class commands the median
position. Thus the vote on the issue pair (a,t)can be viewed as decision by the middle
class on how to maximize its welfare knowing that larger values of a increase welfare
while larger values of treduceit. The vote on the pair (a, p) is a decision to take as
much as possible from the rich by increasing p (subject to incentive effects, of course)
so as to increase a (holding tfixed).Politically, it is a middle class vs. rich world, with
the poor along for the ride. The final equilibrium is likely to have positive values of
a, t, and p. There will be lump-sum subsidies and marginal tax rates which rise with
income. Further, Cukierman and Meltzer argue that a larger gap between before-tax
average and median incomes (assuming the average exceeds the median) will induce
greater redistributions to the poor and middle classes (via a) and a larger degree of tax
progressivity (p). These are testable propositions.
In the context of a general study of the growth of government, Peltzman (1980)
has tested the first of these propositions, that an increase in the variance of pre-tax
incomes or abilties will increase the level of transfers paid to the poor and middle
classes. He tests for the presence of such a positive effect of the variance in pre-tax
incomes on the level of government transfers to the poor and finds that in almost
every setting examined —from2O century time-series data for the U.S for Britain,
As with any SIE model matters of uniqueness and stability must be resolved.
45and for Canada to cross-section data for developed and less developed countries —the
hypothesis is rejected.5° In fact, the observed relationship between the variance in
pre-tax incomes and redistributive spending is strongly negative: as the distribution of
pre-tax incomes becomes more equal, governments spend more —notless —on
redistributive activities!
The empirical rejection of the central predictions of majority-rule models of
redistribution policy suggests that we may be looking in the wrong direction when we
use non-cooperative, or have vs. have-not, models of government transfers and taxes.
While important first steps, neither simple median voter models nor simple
institutional stories of (exogenously given) agenda control by the "haves" or the "have-
nots" can do full justice to the complexity of motives and influences at work. Where
might we turn? Focusing upon the economic motives for social insurance and the role
of political institutions capable of providing, and sustaining, cooperative agreements
across voters for such programs seem to us to be particularly promising avenues for
future work. A cooperative model of income transfers —perhapsmotivated by the
uncertainites most voters face in their ability to earn, or keep, income —maybe
appropriate. Perhaps the "norm of universalism" can be extended to tax and transfer
policies, where some voters want low-income transfers, others want old-age pensions
or health insurance, and still others want investment tax credits or full-loss offsets for
capital gains.51 It is clear that we are only just beginning to understand the economic
50 Thedependent variable in each of these regressions is the share of national
income spent on government activities. Peltzman assumes (correctly, we believe) that
most of government spending is redistributive. There is one direct test which uses low
income transfers as the dependent variable, and the results there are identical to those
elsewhere in the study (see, Peltzman (1980), Table 12, line 14). Peltzman uses a variety
of measures of the distribuition of pre-tax incomes as an independent variable, and the
results are consistent across all the measures used.
The fact that the level of low-income transfers, old-age pensions, and health
insurance expanded in the United States just as the value of tax loopholes increased
46forces and the political institutions which determine a society's tax and transfer
policies.52
C. Public Borrowing
Three hypotheses have been offered in the public finance literature as
rationales for the efficiency of government borrowing. Two hypotheses see debt as a
response to a market failure: The first identifies incomplete intertemporal contracting
opportunities as the motivation for debt, while the second relies on the inability of the
market economy to tully acijust to increasing returns to sca1e. A tiurci hypothesis —
notnecessarily exclusive of the other two —allowsgovernment debt to work in
conjunction with inefficient government taxes to finance public goods. Since tax
inefficiencies typically grow more than proportionally as taxes increase, smoothing
the pattern of tax collections between periods of abnormally high spending (e.g wars)
by over 300% (from $50 billion in 1968 to $170 billion by 1980) may be more than
coincidence—particularly since the major growth in both sets of policies occurred just
as the agenda-setting power in the Congress was becoming more decentralized.
52 Whetheremploying techniques of formal modelling (for example, Wright (1986) on
unemployment insurance), carefully done descriptive studies (see Ferejohn (1984) on
food stamps, Marmor (1973) on Medicare-Medicaid, Moynihan (1973) on low income
cash assistance, or Weaver (1982) on social security), or regression analysis (Orr (1976)
on welfare benefits), detailed program by program studies is the place to begin.
For two case studies which illustrate the implicitly cooperative structure of U.S. tax
policy, see Kantowicz (1985) and Jacob (1985) contrasting the alternative political styles
of Presidents Carter (acting non-cooperatively) and Reagan (acting cooperatively)
towards tax reform. Carter failed to achieve his objectives; Reagan succeeded. From
a formal perspective, Aumann and Kurz (1977) present a cooperative game solution to
the tax-transfer problem; see also Gardner (1981) Osborne (1984), and Peck (1986).
In the first case the private market economy fails to adequately transfer
consumption goods from youth to old age; a government program of public debt
creation (see Diamond (1965)) or mandatory social security (see Samuelson (1975)) may
be able to correct the observed misallocation. In the second case, markets' fail to fully
accomodate all the gains from increasing returns to scale. Here government deficits
can play a typically Keynesian role and jog the economy from a low to a preferred
high employment allocation; see Hart (1982).
47and periods of lower spending will reduce the overall costs of government finance
over time. Each of these three arguments imply that government debt can provide real
economic benefits to voters in society, benefits which may well motivate a compelling
political economy explanation for public borrowing and debt accumulation.
Barro (1979) has provided the first empirical test of a political economic theory
of government borrowing, focusing on the tax-smoothing rationale for public debt. In
Barro's analysis, today's voters are efficiently linked to all future voters through intra-
family transfers called bequests. Positive bequests improve the welfare of future
family members, while negative bequests (children caring for parents) are used to
improve the position of current family members. Families decide the optimal
allocation of family welfare over time, and Barro assumes that all bequests needed to
facilitate the allocation are achieved. Government debt, therefore, has no role to play
in improving intertemporal allocations; indeed, any attempt to use such debt to alter
the flow of resources across generations will simply be undone by a realignment of
family bequests (Barro, 1974). In Barro's economy, the job of government debt is to
insure an efficient system of public finance by reallocating tax burdens from periods
of abnormally high government spending to periods of lower spending. Such tax-
smoothing will minimize the excess burden and collection costs of paying for public
goods. Further, each voter should agree to such a use for government debt, since tax-
smoothing can never hurt and it may help. There really is no need for politics in
Barro's model because there is no conflict. A hired bureaucrat simply sets the future
pattern of taxes and debt so as to minimize the collection and efficiency costs of
paying for (an already agreed upon) level of public services. The bureaucrat will
increase debt —thatis, run a deficit —whengovernment spending is higher than
average or when the national tax base (e.g., income) is lower than average. In such
instances, new debt lowers the tax rate needed to finance public goods and thereby
48reduces the efficiency costs of taxation. In a careful empirical analysis of U.S.
government debt since 1922, Barro (1979) finds support for the main predictions of the
theory: deficits are larger both in periods of abnormally high levels of government
spending and in periods of abnormally low national income. Horrigan (1986) using
U.S. data from 1790-1981 also finds support for the tax-smoothing hypothesis.54
Only one result from the Barro and Horrigan studies runs counter to the
prediction of the tax-smoothing model. Deficits are far more responsive to declines in
national income than any plausible parameters for the model might indicate. The
strong effect of a fall in income on deficits is a puzzle for the tax-smoothing
hypothesis, but the answer may lie in a model of debt policy which allows for a real
effect of debt on incomes. When incomes fall abnormally low, perhaps voters respond
by choosing to increase debt to increase incomes?
A Keynesian policy model based upon the economy's failure to efficiently
accomodate increasing returns to scale does prescribe the use of government debt to
increase aggregate demand and thereby stimulate aggregate employment (see Hart
(1982)). There is the possibility of one unwanted side-effect of such debt stimulated
increases in aggregate demand, and that is inflation. In such a model, expected real
income will rise as unemployment falls, and decline as prices rise. Citizens who are
fully employed will clearly be hurt by deficit financing as increases in deficits only
increase national prices. They always vote no to added borrowing. Citizens who face
a risk of unemployment, however, may well favor some deficit financing. As deficits
rise, the fall in unemployment might dominate the concurrent increase in prices
leading to a rise in a voter's expected real incomes. It is not implausible to imagine
Epple and Schipper (1981) advance a tax-smoothing argument for government debt
created by state-local government pension underfundings. They find some support for
the hypothesis in their sample of small towns in Pennsylvania. For an alternative
model of such debt, see Inman (1982, l987a).
49that in such an economy voters' preferences over alternative levels of deficits are
single-peaked (Nordhaus (1975)), and further, that voters facing higher anticipated
levels of unemployment will prefer higher levels of deficit financing. If so, then we
can invoke Black's theorem and assign the politically preferred levelof deficits to that
voter with the median preference for new borrowing. Those with secure employment
—uppermanagement and workers with seniority —votefor zero deficits, while those
who benefit most in a very taut economy —theunskilled and young workers —will
prefer large deficits. The median position is likely to be occupied by employees
without seniority working in cyclically sensitive industries. A Keynesian based
political economy model of deficit financing would predict that it is to this groupthat
the Democrats and Republicans, or Labor and Conservatives, will direct their
economic policies. Such models of deficit financing have been specified and estimated
to explain a "political business cycle" driven by government fiscal policy. The
empirical evidence for the presence of such cycles is mixed atbest.55 Our concern
with this approach to understanding government debt policy is more fundamental,
however. The analysis rests upon a Keynesian model of deficit financing which may
be of limited applicability, both historically and for today's economy. If, as current
empirical research seems to indicate, the long-run trade-off between inflation and
unemployment is fully inelastic at some natural rate of unemployment, then there will
be no permanent advantages to new borrowing in such amodel.56 All deficits will do
The literature begins with Nordhaus (1975) and has been well summarized and
criticized in a recent book by Fassbender and Hibbs (1981).
56 While thelong-run trade-off may be vertical, the short-run trade-off —sayfor
periods of two years or less —maywell have a negative slope allowing temporary
gains in lower unemployment with modest inflation. If so, political parties might try
to stimulate the economy just before elections, and then pay the price with stag-f lation
after the election. It is not clear that rational, informed voters would tolerate such
behavior, however, particularly since inflation is likely to have significant long- run
consequences through interest rate uncertainity and investmentdisincentives. A
50is create inflation. If so, then within the model all voters should prefer zero new debt,
clearly a prediction in violation of the facts.
We are left, then, with the third motivation for government debt as a possible
basis for a political economy explanation of government borrowing: the need to
improve intertemporal contracting. Sjoblom (1985) and Cukierman and Meltzer (l986a)
develop such a model. Here government debt facilitates desired intertemporal re-
allocations, allocations not now available through a market economy or through a
network of intra-family bequests. The fundamental source of this market failure is
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bequests, even though such bequests are desired by all generations as a means of
sharing growing family wealth. If a current generation of working adults shares its
new wealth by caring for their poorer retired parents (the negative bequest), there is
no assurance that their children will care for them. Yet without such assurances
(enslaving your child is illegal) the current working cohort may be discouraged from
caring for its parents. If so, optimal negative bequests become infeasible and desired
transfers remain undone. Coercive government debt and taxes —orequivalently,
mandatory social security —isone possible solution to the problem.
In Sjoblom's (1985) model all voters wish to leave such negative bequests. The
failure to commit resources from young to old leads to too little income in old-age.
Both government debt —throughwhich the current young buy bonds redeemable in
theory of debt policy based upon the short-run Phillips curve could be developed but
it would require naive, myopic voters; see, for example, Fair (1978) for some evidence
on the point. An interesting alternative model of political macro-policy has been
recently developed by Alesina and Sachs (forthcoming) to explain government
monetary policy. It assumes neither naive nor myopic voters. It does, however, require
rotating agenda-setters —forexample, a Democratic party which prefers to help the
very poor or a Republican party which favors investment and capital formation.
While originally developed as a positive theory of monetary policy, the model of
Alesina and Sachs should also extend easily into a behavioral theory of deficit
financing.
51their old age and whose proceeds are used to pay back the current elderly —or
mandatory social security —throughwhich the current young pay taxes to support the
current elderly with the requirement that they too will be supported when they retire -
- cansolve the problem. Debt levels or social security benefits are then to be decided
by majority rule. In Sjoblom's model, the desired level of debt or social security
benefits rise with age. Voter preferences are single-peaked and the median- aged
voter is decisive. Since all voters (by assumption) desire negative bequests, a positive
level of government debt and/or social security benefits will be provided.57
Cukierman and Meltzer (l986a) note, how.ever, that not all voters may wish to
leave negative bequests. If abilities differ across households and generations, then
some current voters who expect to be richer than their children may prefer to leave
positive bequests. These transfers are economically feasible, and thus for these voters
mandatory social security or government debt is redundant. Every dollar which debt
or social security transfers to them in their retirement years, they return to their
children in increased positive bequests. It would appear that such voters are
unaffected by, and thus indifferent to, the creation of public debt. Not so, for
government debt or mandatory social security can have real economic consequences
which affect the well-being of all voters. New debt expands the consumption set of
the currently (negative) bequest constrained, which may lead to increased current
period consumption in the economy as a whole. Increased aggregate current period
consumption necessarily means less real resources for current period capital
In fact the level of public debt or social security spending chosen by the median
voter may be inefficiently too large. The efficient level would balance the marginal
costs of contributions over a citizen's full lifetime against the marginal benefits of
transfers in old age. The median aged voter, however, takes his past contributions as
given and votes for that old age benefit which balances the marginal costs of only his
future contributions against the benefits of transfers in old age. Thus the median
voter's marginal costs are less than the true social marginal costs and there will be a
democratically approved over- provision of benefits to the elderly. See Sjoblom (1985).
52accumulation, a fall in the capital-to-labor ratio over time, a fall in real wages, and a
rise in the before-tax rate of return; see Seidman (1984). New debt therefore affects all
voters in this bequest constrained economy, and now the identification of the median
voter (even assuming preferences are single-peaked) becomes a good deal more
difficult. In the Cukierman-Meltzer framework the final pro-debt coalition will
include the rich with bequests who benefit from higher interest rates and the very
poor who still (despite the adverse wage effects) prefer negative bequests from their
children to themselves in their old age. The median voter, however, is likely to be the
middle class worker who gains little from the higher interest rate (and loses if he
borrows), losses significantly from the fall in real wages, and who has only a modest
bequest motive. All this points to low levels of new government debt, but with debt
rising as the income distribution spreads, as the share of middle class wealth in non-
human capital grows, and as positive bequests increase. These are testable
propositions, but for now the tests remain to be done.58
There is, however, a more fundamental omission in this debt as bequest story.
If the central reason for positive government debt is to overcome the failure of
markets to assure an efficient intertemporal allocation of consumption from young to
old, how can we be sure a government, run by the same people who threaten to renege
on their market or family commitments, can guarantee a government commitment to
make transfers? Tomorrow's voters can always repeal laws passed today and thereby
repudiate the public debt or cancel social security. Once again, today's working adults
58Theonly empirical work we know on the determinants of government debt which
uses an intergenerational transfer model as a motivation is the work of Inman (1982,
l987a) on state and local government pension underfunding. In that model current
taxpayers and current public employees conspire to exploit future taxpayers by
shifting current pension obligations onto future taxpayers and using the resources
saved to increase current consumption. The conspiracy works to the extent such
pension promises are enforceable (they are) and to the extent such underfundings are
not capitalized into current taxpayers' asset holdings in land (they are probably not).
53cannot be sure they will be cared for with the same level of support they have given
to today's elderly. Yet without that guarantee, they may well choose to minimize their
losses and provide zero debt and social security benefits. We are back to the
beginning now with no clear explanation as to why democratic governments in fact
provide debt and mandatory social security. Recent analyses by Sjoblom (1985) and
Hammond (1975) may provide the answer. They characterize a stable, cooperative
solution for this non-cooperative allocation game between generations, a solution in
which the young do take care of the old if they believe that only under these
conditions will their children provide for them. We conclude that not unlike spending
and taxes, the creation of government debt may best be understood as a cooperative
political solution to what is originally a non-cooperative economic game.
D. Summary
The positive analysis of government spending, taxes, and new borrowing has
produced significant and sometimes policy useful results. The median voter model
enriched by the possibility of agenda-setter control has been tested and found to be a
plausible framework for the analysis of democratic fiscal choice when choices are
reasonably constrained to decisions along one policy dimension. The restriction is
most plausible for governments purchasing a single public good and such models have
been used with insight for the estimation of the incidence of local public goods
(Martinez-Vazquez, 1982), for the calculation of economic inefficiency in the provision
of local services (Barlow, 1970, and Sonstelie, 1982), and for the normative evaluation of
federal and state grants-in-aid (Inman, 1978b). The one dimension median voter model
has also been used for the analysis of tax policy and debt creation, but here with only
mixed success. Median voter analysis has revealed important tensions within the
process of democratic fiscal choice —tensionsbetween the provision of public goods
54and income transfers, between rich and poor, and between young and old —butby
itself the model has proven incapable of doing justice to the truly multi-dimensional
nature of such fiscal allocations.
Necessarily, political economists have turned to multi-dimensional models of
democratic decision-making. The move has not been easy. No longer is a careful
specification of tastes and technology enough, for as Arrow has shown generally and
McKelvey specifically, simple majority rule processes alone give no stable outcome in
the multi-dimensional setting. Yet fiscal allocations by real democratic economies are
often very stable. As we have seen in our review of collective choice theory, to insure
stability in our predictive models of fiscal choice we need more structure. We need to
understand political institutions and to know our fiscal histories, for it is institutions
and history, along with tasted and technologies, which define the stable equilibrium.
That additional structure has been developed within the basic setting of a non-
cooperative majority rule game using, first, the institution of agenda-control and the
theory of structure-induced equilibrium and, second, the institution of political
compromise and issue-trading and the theory of cooperative bargaining. Both
approaches have been used with some success in the analysis of spending, tax, and
debt policy, but much remains to be done. At a theoretical level we need to
understand the logical origins of the institutions of agenda-control and cooperation as
they might evolve from the original, unstable world of tastes, technologies, and
majority rule alone.59 At an empirical level we must bring together econometric
methodologies and fiscal data from governments with alternative institutional
Shepsle and Weingast (1987) analyze the source of agenda power in legislatures
from such primary conditions. Important work by Rubinstein (1982), and by Binmore,
Rubinstein, and Wolinski (1985) seek to do the same for cooperative models of
bargaining, although that work is limited to two players and therefore is not strictly
applicable to our problem of motivating cooperation in a many-player setting with
majority rule.
55structures to identify which of the competing models of fiscal choice most accurately
describes how governments actually set spending, debt, and taxes. Only then can we
begin to offer sound advice on how best to reform our institutions of fiscal choice.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The sometime failure of voluntary market institutions to achieve an efficient
and fair allocation of social resources raises the possibility that government
institutions might somehow do it better. In varying degrees, modern industrial
economies have turned to the coercive, collective choice institutions of government to
ostensibly correct such market failures. Governments provide public goods,
redistribute incomes, and regulate economic activities. The results are not always
what we might hope. Many times the problem is simply poor information about the
consequences of public policies. In such instances, contemporary public finance
research has often provided the analysis needed for more informed public sector
allocations; see, for example, the other essays in this volume. More often than not,
however, the problem is not poor information, but rather, faulty institutions.
Governments fail to be efficient or fair not because citizens or their elected
representatives do not know better, but because they do! Given (the presumption) that
individuals are utility maximizing agents, we should expect such agents as they vote
and as they bargain to seek their most advantageous allocation. Those advantageous
allocations are often achieved at another's, or even their own long-run, expense. The
over-provision of public goods by budget-maximizing agenda-setters (Romer and
Rosenthal, 1979), the excessive level of transfers to the elderly in democratic societies
(Sjoblom, 1985), and the inefficient financing of "pork-barrel" public projects by
majority rule legislatures (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981) are each examples of
possible government misallocations.
56These observations raise a next question: Can we improve the allocative
performance of governments, and if so, how should it be done? It is naive to assume
that we as economists, lawyers, or political scientists can simply instruct governments
to do it better. To alter the performance of governments we must alter the structure
of how government decisions are made: agent tastes, public technologies, or the rules
of collective choice. As tastes and technologies are generally immune to policy
manipulations, we are left then to look for new and preferred rules of collective
choice. In effect, we must seek better political institutions.
Central to this task is a careful understanding of how public institutions now
influence the formation of economic policy. Analyses to date have provided a
reasonably accurate picture of how single purpose, majority rule governments reach
and enforce decisions, but we are only just beginning to understand the important role
that political institutions play in the setting of multi-dimensional economic policies.
Non-cooperative majority rule processes with monopoly or rotating agenda-setters
have been modelled formally as have cooperative processes of political compromise.
Good empirical studies of the formation of fiscal policy under either of these
institutional structures are scarce, however. Further, empirical or theoretical political
economy models of fiscal policy-making which jointly determine taxes, borrowing, and
public spending have not yet been specified. Yet such analyses are central to any
reasoned evaluation of institutional reform. Finally, deeper theoretical research is
needed on institutional evolution within a simple majority rule setting. When political
institutions are themselves endogenous, we must expect that institutions will evolve
according to the incentives of government agents. There is no guarantee that an
appealing institutional reform will be effective in altering allocative outcomes if
voters or politicians can circumvent the reform. Theorists and empiricists interested
57in political economy have much good and important work to do before we can
confidently propose a new order for conducting national fiscal policy.
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